Thursday, April 11, 2013

Snatch! (Part two)

It was just about 0100 hours as we sat down and was watching the valley below, one of the PARU came over to me and pointed towards the north end of the valley.  There were lights coming down the valley floor.  Lots of lights...moving north to south.  Once they got about ninety degrees to our position I could hear truck engines.  This was a large group of enemy personnel moving south towards South Vietnam.  This caravan went on for the rest of the night and into the early morning.  We were just coming out of the rainy season and usually the NVA and PL did not move much at night during it.  I had one of the PARU count the trucks and another one count individual lights that appeared to be in the hands of individual soldiers.  Just about daylight, the last of the lights passed our position and disappeared to the south.  I then sent a coded message to Vientiane with the numbers we had collected.  

I had made a radio check with Akkrat about 0300 hours and then right after I sent the message to Vientiane, I contacted Akkrat again to make sure he was okay.  He said he had started the clearing operation and hoped to have it done by noon the next day.  He had put out scouts and they had seen no enemy movement on their side of the mountain or in the valley below them.  That was a good sign as far as I was concerned.
Most of the day was spent in our "hide", but one of the PARU went on on scouting missions about every two hours or so to make sure no one was trying to sneak up on us.  All-in-all, it was a pretty quiet day.  The only thing that I had  heard from team Falcon was the double squelch break that let us know they were okay.  Breaking squelch means that they keyed up the mike for one second, unkeyed it for two seconds, and then rekeyed it a second time.  I would, in turn, acknowledge them with a double squelch break letting them know I got the status check.  The SF guys only used voice communications via radio when they were in trouble and needed assistance.  I am sure they were in contact with Vientiane with voice communications even if they didn't contact me.

There was some movement on the trail during the day, but nothing like we witnessed the previous night.  We seemed to have a good vantage point and a good hide so we stayed put for the next night.  Again, as on the previous night a lot of movement in the valley below.  We again witnessed a lot of trucks and personnel moving down the trail.  Again I passed on this information to Vientiane.

On the third day, we heard from Falcon who made a voice transmission.  This was sort of unusual as they normally didn't make contact with us until they were on their way to us.  They stated that they were "on target" meaning that they had their person in sight and were ready to make the snatch.  Not much happened again that day and we were relaxed about the situation, but still very alert to what might be coming our way unannounced. But it still bothered me to some extent that Falcon effectively broke protocol and made a voice transmission.

Late that third night all hell broke lose in the valley below.  There were several big explosions and we could see that something big had blown up.  The place where all this was taking place was really on fire.....a really big fire.  Although it was distant, we could hear small arms fire and secondary small explosions.  The valley and surrounding mountains carried the sound up to us.   The radio came to life and Falcon told me they were on their way to us.  Falcon said they were about 12 to 18 hours from our position....if we were where we were supposed to be. It was a little after 0300 hours.  I rogered the transmission and now it was just a waiting game.  I notified Vientiane of the situation and they replied to keep them advised as to the progress of Falcon.  With all the road traffic in the valley below, I wondered how Falcon was going to get to us, but I was sure Peterson had a plan.  And I am sure he had a backup plan and backup plan to the backup plan.  Peterson didn't leave much to chance. He often quoted Gen. George Patton when Patton said something to the effect that you " always need a backup plan because the first plan never works anyway."

Just as it got light enough to see, what I saw caused a real pucker factor to take place.  There were all kinds of NVA troops below us in the valley, maybe a battalion.  They were moving in daylight and moving north to south down the valley and they were in a hurry.  Normally, I would have called in an airstrike of T-28's, but I wasn't able to do that because Falcon was operating somewhere close by.  I could only surmise that this had something to do with Falcon.  By about noon, the traffic had subsided substantially, but there were still groups of enemy troops moving down the valley.  I was watching one group which stopped and then broke off from those moving south.  This group of twenty or so broke off from the main body and turned toward the west up towards a draw just to our south.  I knew I had to contact Falcon.  This group meant to cut them off.  I don't think they knew we were on the mountain, but I think they thought Falcon would come that way.    I called Falcon and just made a simple statement.  "Enemy in small valley between you and us.  Maybe twenty or thirty troops."   I got his "double squelch break" and knew he had heard me.  A little more than a hour later a firefight broke out in the ravine to our south.   I heard small arms fire and some grenades go off, and probably a couple of claymore mines.  Finally, Falcon called us and said they were on the slope with the enemy in close pursuit.  The radio operator said that we would need to provide covering fire once they got over the first ridge.  I told my three indigs they needed to set up to provide covering fire after Falcon crossed the ridge.  They would be under us but the NVA soldiers would be exposed as they came over the ridge.  The range was about 400 yards.  The AK's would be of little help at that range and hitting something was problematical.  However, I had brought my FLN and it was effective out to 600 yards, maybe more under ideal conditions. A short while later I watched through the binoculars as Falcon crossed the ridge.  I put the barrel of my FLN on a rock and tried to remain as steady as I could.  It took about 15 minutes for the NVA to reach the ridge.  As the first one reached to top of the ridge, I fired one round.  From experience, I knew that I would have to aim about 15" above the target to hit it. At 600 yards I would have had to aim 72 inches above the target to hit  it. Good thing the range was about 400 yards.   It was like slow motion.  It seemed forever but I know it wasn't a second and the bullet hit it's target.  The NVA soldier toppled over.  A second came over the ridge and he met the same fate.  It  would have been nice to have had a telescopic sight, but my FLN didn't come with one.  To this day I don't think they knew another team was on the mountain.  When several others crossed the ridge I was able to knock down two more but seven or eight passed quickly beyond my view.  I now think the enemy troops thought it was Falcon doing the shooting because they never once looked our way.

I contacted Vientieane and told them of the situation.  They asked for my ETA at the LS.  I figured it would be at least another hour before Falcon got to us.  Then it was a hard eight to twelve hours to the LS.  And, I didn't know what kind of shape Falcon was going to be in when they got to us.  I informed Vietieane that 0400 the next day would be my guess.  They told me they would schedule extraction for 0700 hours.  I contacted Akkrat and told him of the situation on our side of the mountain and when I expected to arrive at his location.  The firefight below us had subsided some with only intermittent firing going on. Akkrat told me that the clearing operation was complete, but one of his scouts had sighted enemy troops on the south side of their location.   He did not know if they knew he was there or not, but he was planning as if they did.  I had not heard any additonal weapons being fired for some minutes and I wondered what Falcon was doing.  I didn't have long to wait.  I heard two claymores go off and then a grenade and some small arms fire just below us. Over the radio I heard Falcon say that they would be in view in five minutes and not to shoot in their direction until they got to us.

As Falcon came into view I counted eleven persons.  There was Peterson and the two SF guys, seven Indigs, and one Caucasian with about ten days growth of beard.  Two Indig SF guys were missing.  Two of the Indigs that made it to us were wounded.  One of the SF guys was also bleeding from two wounds.  But before I had time to ask any questions all hell broke loose.  Bullets started flying around like bees from a disturbed hive. One of my Thais took a round in the leg.  I told Peterson to get his team moving up the trail and I would follow behind.  He had his Indigs set some claymore mines around where we were as he pulled out.  They set the fuses for two minutes.  Fortunately we were on high ground with some rocks providing cover.  It was easier for us to fire down on the enemy soldiers than it was for them to fire up at us without them breaking cover.  We threw a couple of grenades down on the guys firing at us, and then followed Team Falcon up the trail.  A minute or so after we cleared the area we heard the claymores go off.  I could only hope it took out some of the enemy in pursuit of us.  I told my team to stop and let me make contact with Akkrat.  I was able to do so and told him that Falcon was on their way to him and that he might need to lend them some assistance.  I listened to see if I could hear the enemy behind us but I didn't hear any movement.  It could be that the claymores killed some of them or  that it scared them enough to slow them down.  We moved as quickly as we could so that we could catch up to the SF team in front of us.  We were making our way around the south side of the mountain when I heard gunfire in front of us.  It now appeared that the enemy troops I saw go up the draw earlier had made it up the mountain and had run into Peterson's team.

We made our way towards the gunfire but it took about five minutes to get to where the action was taking place.  We saw the enemy soldiers before they saw us and and being that we were above them, we had an advantage.  We unloaded on them from about 50 to 100 yards from them. Between the four of us some 100 rounds went down on them and all but one was killed or wounded and that one made a fast retreat from us.  We caught up to Peterson and in the ambush he had been wounded although at the time, I didn't think it was serious.  One more of his Indigs had gone down with a round to the head.  He was obviously deceased.  We all once again got moving toward the LS.  It took us six hours to move to the LS and we didn't encounter any more enemy troops in our trek.  By now it was about 0430 in the morning.  Boy was I glad to see Akkrat.  It was dark and hard to see, but the LS looked pretty good to me.  Peterson called everyone together and told them we needed to set up a defensive perimeter for he was sure we were soon to have some more company.  He laid out his plan and then sent two of his Indigs back down the trail to set some claymores.  He determined that we would have a hard time defending the ground to the north, so he sent another couple of his people and they set claymores  along that perimeter as well.  He scattered his men around the LS and Akkrat put his men to the south end of the LS.  I was to stay with Peterson so he had immediate radio contact with Vientiane. Everything was very quiet.  That was never a good sign.  Not a bird or animal was making any kind of sound. And so the wait for extraction began.  Peterson sat down next to me but said nothing.  If things were bad previously, it was about to get a whole lot worse.

(To Be Continued)





Monday, March 11, 2013

Snatch! (Part 1)

As we were landing in the Porter, I looked down the runway and knew something big was up.  As we came to a stop on the tarmac, I looked over at the helicopter pad and saw eight H-34 helicopters.  Having extra H-34's usually meant that the mission was going to be at the limits of the H-34's range which was about 180 miles. The number of helicopters was unusual as we normally had no more than four at any one time at Long Trieng.   From past experience I knew that the extra choppers would carry fuel so that we could refuel at some place along the way.   Something else was different as well.  Akkrat had twelve PARU  with him and the SF guys milling around the heli-pad was equal to that number.  There was a total of  twenty-six SOG and Paru on site.  Add me and that made a nice round twenty-seven.  As I was exiting the Porter, I saw Col. Bradley walking my way with Lt. Peterson of team Falcon and Akkrat, my PARU sergeant.  He grabbed me by the arm and literally led me to a vehicle where he, myself, Akkrat and Peterson got in and he drove us to a secluded spot away from the runway.   Bradley handed all three of us maps of an area really close to the DMZ in Vietnam.   He looked at Peterson and said, "This is a 'snatch" mission.  Falcon, you will be in charge of the the "snatch"part of the mission.  Navigator, you will be handling the air assets as usual.   Akkrat, you will cut a new LS into this mountain's west side (he pointed at a place on Akkrat's map). This is either a three day, five day, or forever mission.  The forever part is if you get killed while you are on it."  "Navigator, you and Akkrat's team will be inserted some distance from Falcon's insertion site.  Akkrat's men will clear a new LS.  We will try to provide some noise not too distant with some strafing and bombing runs to cover your noise in clearing the site.  The site will need to be big enough to land two H-34's at the same time.  If you are discovered before the site is complete, you will be evacuated as soon as we can arrange it.  If the site has been cleared and you are discovered, you will fight and hold it as long as possible.  Understood?"

File:Sikorsky H-34s VNAF at Tan Son Nhut AB.jpg

H-34's, range 182 miles, load 16 troops with gear.  Armament, none.

We all acknowledged that we understood.  He went on, "This is a mission with a 'need to know' informational plan.  Falcon knows his mission parameters.   He knows his objective.  Navigator, you only need to know what is available in the way of air assets and operating frequencies.  Akkrat, all you need to know is that clearing the LS is very important for the success of this mission. This will be a hairy mission because of where you will be operating and the number of enemy soldiers in the area.  Navigator, your job is to provide everyone a safe exit from the LS at the end of the mission.  I have no doubt this will be a "hot" mission.  Carry extra ammunition, water and food."  "Navigator," he continued, "While Akkrat is clearing the LS on the west side of this mountain (he pointed to a spot on the map), you will take three of the PARU that Akkrat will select, and go to the east side of the mountain and find a place to watch the valley below.  You will watch and keep us posted on what you see via our HF radio frequencies.  Move only at night, get cover before daylight and keep your eyes open all night.  Got that?'  I said, "Yes, sir, I've got it."  ." 

"Falcon," said Bradley, "Try to not get into a shooting war over there.  Be as discrete as you can and try not to be seen and just do the job you have been sent over there to do.  Don't try and be a hero.  If the missions goes bad, get the hell out of there.  Akkrat and Navigator will have your back."  "I want you to know," Bradley added, "that this is a very dangerous mission for all of you.  You are close to the Vietnamese DMZ and on the "trail."  There are literally hundreds of NVA plus a thousand or so Pathet Lao in that area.  Don't take unnecessary risks."  Bradley then handed Peterson and me a sheet with the operating frequencies that we would use on this mission.  Each frequency has a corresponding number, like 5.530 MHZ would be frequency number 24, 5.450 would be number 18 and so on.  That way, if we needed to change frequencies, we didn't have to give away the frequencies we were going to change to.  (Heck, I know ending with a preposition is not good literary form, but I am not a writer and I am going to take some poetic license here.)  I had in my hand a list of ten HF frequencies to be used based on time of day and atmospheric conditions.  I also had the TAC AIR frequencies which would be my links to the aircraft and helicopters who would be supporting this.  I had to memorize these on the way to the LS and then destroy the paper they were written on.  Then Bradley gave us his final words before he took us back to the helicopter pad.  "This is a very classified mission. Regardless of the outcome, this mission never happened.  Nothing is to be talked about now or after it is over except to brief me.  Is that understood?"  We all affirmed that we understood.  "One more thing Navigator, I have it on good authority that there might be fast flyers in the area practicing bombing runs.  If you or Falcon get into trouble, they might be in the area and available for your use."  I knew what he meant by the term "fast flyers."  They were the code name for the F-100 Super Sabers of the 524th Fighter Wing recently stationed at Udorn.  They were not allowed, by the Geneva Convention, to operate in Laos, but I guess they practiced there...yeah, right!  He then drove us back to the helicopter pad, dropped us off, and then drove away.  I was surprised because I had never seen Bradley at Long Trieng.  He was always in Vientiane.  Very strange, this turn of events, I thought.

MSgt Al Chang / The National Archives

Typical SF Strike Team

  After we got out of the car, Peterson told both Akkrat and myself that we would leave the next evening.  That would give us about 24 hours to round up whatever we needed for the mission.  When we got over to the H-34's, Akkrat had already loaded axes, shovels, pry bars, and other tools on one of the helicopters along with a couple of cases of AK-47 ammo and two cases of grenades.  I would provide him with some C-4 and det cord after we got on the ground.  Lt. Peterson dismissed us at that point and let us go our own ways for the next 24 hours.  He said he was going to take his team out into the surrounding jungle and do a little more training before bedding down for the night.  With that, he rounded up his people and headed south.  I noticed that Peterson's men were also a mixture of SF and Indig guys.  I asked him who they were.  He said, " These guys are the best that the South Vietnamese have as soldiers.  They are the equivalent of our Special Forces.  They have been trained in the U.S. at our Special Forces School at Ft. Bragg.  They are arranged just like our teams except that they are numbered differently."  I already knew this from previous missions, but it was good to be informed of it again. I won't go over this again because I have previously wrote about it and it really isn't that important here.  When I counted the members of Falcon's team, it was three U.S. SF guys and nine Vietnamese.  This was a rather large group.  Most trail watch teams were made of four, five or six members.  Recon teams normally didn't have this many men.  So, I was puzzled about this mission, that is for sure.  I had previously loaded my rucksack with what I needed for most three day missions, so I added some extra rations and water.  I then decided that my Swedish K sub-machine gun might not be suitable for this mission and loaded my FN-FAL Belgium battle rifle into the chopper.  It turned out later to be the right choice.  According the the map there was a large cleared area where I would be located so a longer range weapon would be more appropriate.

I threw in twenty, twenty round clips of ammo plus 200 rounds of loose ammo which I would pack up in the morning.  The beauty of the FN-FAL was that it was very accurate out to 600 yards and effective out to a  1000 yards.  It weighed about the same as the M-14 and used the same ammunition which was readily available in Laos.  I prefered 150 grain FMJ bullets over the 140 or 165 grain bullets also available at the time.  My FN-FAL had a snap on scope and I carried 20 rounds of specially loaded match grade 7.62 X .51 that was zeroed to the scope at 600 yards.  It could also deliver an automatic rate of fire of about 600 rounds per minute. The disadvantage of using any battle rifle is the extra weight of the weapon along with larger heavier ammo.  But the heavier bullet could cut through brush as compared to my 9MM weapons.  I had been in and out of Laos for just about a year now, so I was pretty well prepared for most situations.  After all, I had been a Boy Scout.  Later in the evening Akkrat and his men showed up and he posted guards on the choppers since they were loaded with weapons and ammunition.  The remaining PARU climbed in various H-34's and slept in them that evening.  I went to the Air America hooch and sacked out on a cot.

The FN FAL Automatic Rifle recently built in Brazil under license

Belgium FN-FAL 7.62 X 51 (One of the best weapons I have ever fired)



The next morning I was awake by 6 AM and went out to check of Akkrat.  They were already cooking their breakfast of meat and rice.  I checked the helicopters to make sure our gear was still there (it sometimes mysteriously disappeared if left unwatched).  Everything appeared in order.  The SF guys had pitched some shelter halves on the southeast side of the runway and were now taking them down.  Peterson organized his group and they took off on a morning run.  They ended up doing about five miles or so.  Then they prepared their morning meals.  They invited me to share some of their food, but in those days, I rarely ate breakfast.  Maybe a piece of toast or something light and some juice, but that was about it.

Everything the rest of the morning and early afternoon was pretty relaxed with everyone working on their weapons and packing their rucksacks.  About 5 PM, the aircrews starting showing up.  These were not Air America aircrews.  I don't know who they were, but certainly not our AA guys.  They were probably French Mercs as they spoke French and also English with a French accent, but they could have been anyone.  It was then that it dawned on me that there were no AA marking on the helicopters.  Matter of fact, there were no markings of any kind...except for a single line aircraft number.  The only place I saw helicopters like these were on the drug raids.  This told me that this mission was special indeed.  It also came to me that we might not be snatching a person....maybe something else.  Well, that was for someone else to worry about as we were about to set off for the DMZ or at least close to it.

Peterson went around and did a weapons and gear check and we all boarded the choppers.  Peterson said that we would stop at a safe LS and refuel from the support helicopters when we got within 60 miles of the insertion site.  Remember, that above with the picture of the H-34's I stated that the range of the H-34 was about 182 miles.  To make sure they had hover time around the insertion sites, they would refuel before instead of after the insertion.  I also knew that we would have some T-28's, call sign "Cobra"  standing off at some distance just in case we needed assistance.  We lifted off and headed west.  After about an hour's flying time we found the LS we would use for refueling and landed.  We had a four choppers with us and four still sitting at Long Trieng in case of an emergency.  The two refueling helicopter would remain at this LS until the two transporting the two teams came back and the all four would fly back to Long Trieng.  After we landed I was glad to see some of General Vang Pao's troops come out of the jungle and they helped with the refueling.  They were sent to guard the LS and to protect the helicopters that would remain here.  There must have been between fifty and one-hundred of them armed with M-1 carbines and M-1 Garand rifles.  All of this was supplied to the army of General Vang Pao by the CIA and was WWII and Korean War surplus.

After about an hour, having refueled, we took off again for our destinations.  The pilots knew exactly where they were going and they were flying as low as they could.  After a while, I noticed that the chopper carrying Peterson and his team had disappeared.  It had split off for it's destination which wasn't the same as ours.  We flew in low over a simi-open area on the side of the mountain.  The elephant grass was at least ten feet tall and the space too small to land the choppers in.  The pilot dropped down as close as he could and we started throwing our gear out the door to ground below.  The PARU had already rigged the ropes and we climbed down them to the ground below.  Later on there was rappelling gear and harnesses and such, but we didn't have them at this time.  So you just scrambled down the ropes.  As soon as we were all on the ground, the chopper took off and moved some five miles away and began doing dummy insertions just in case the enemy was watching.  That way, he would have to guess as to which one was the real deal if in fact any of them were.  All we could hope for is that no one saw us as we inserted.  It would be a short mission if anyone had seen us.  After awhile, I didn't hear or see the H-34's  any longer.  I did do a radio check with them to make sure our radios were good to go.

Akkrat began setting up a defensive perimeter and got things ready for the first night on the mountain.  We were, at least according to my altimeter, about 2500 feet ASL.  I told Akkrat I needed to make my way to the other side of the mountain and needed him to let me know who was going with me.  He had already selected the three guys and he called them over.  All three spoke passable English so I would be alright communicating with them.  I was glad they were Thais.  I never really trusted the Laotians I worked with as they could easily be Pathet Lao plants.  They picked up my two radios, their packs and weapons, and we set off for the east side of the mountain.  It would take us more than six hours to get to a position where we could watch the valley below.  After we arrived at our watch site, we settled in for the night with each of us pulling two hours of guard duty during the night.  However, the night was going to be anything but quiet and peaceful.

(To be Continued)