Snow White Part II

 

The warning light came on in the darkness of the C-123 letting us know we were close to the first drop site.  But since we were jumping pretty close to each other, all three teams did equipment checks and buttoned everything down they could.  The C-123's ramp lowered as we approached the drop zone five minutes away.  I heard the crew chief yell now just as the green light came on.  The TACAN went out first followed by four PARU soldiers.  The red light came back on and two minutes later it went green again and we all who remained went out into the night sky.  Our pilot must have been really good.  We were within 200 yards of the original LZ.  I watched as the assault team disappeared into the darkness.  My task was now to find a good hide for my team with a view of the valley below.

 

B-26's at Tahkli RTAFB

                           Above is a C-123 Provider at LS20-A, Long Trieng, Laos

As the sun came up, we found we were in an excellent position to see the entire valley.  I tried to spot the assault team but they too had gone to ground.  Now it was just a waiting game.  No one knew when this caravan would show up for sure.  All we knew is that it was on its way.  I radioed Vientiane that "all boots were on the ground."  I knew the assault team had the same radios I had, but I had no idea as to who they may be in contact with besides me.  We had a breakfast of dry spicy rice and water.  This was the standard fare for the Thai's and I learned to eat it as well.  It was easy to carry, had little bulk or weight and would keep you nourished for several days.  Not particularly tasty, but okay.  I ate it anytime the team was in the field and that is why to this day, I won't hardly eat rice.  Another reason I ate the rice instead of C rations in the field was because of what the Thais told me.  What you eat eventually comes out of your body.  If you eat American rations, what comes out will smell different that what the people in the area excrete.  The Laotians away from the cities did not have latrines or outhouses as such.  They just wandered out into the adjacent area to go to the bathroom. We did the same thing.  A good tracker will know that foreigners are in the area just from that smell alone.  So, for a day prior to going into the bush and during the hump, I ate exactly what the Thais ate.  I think my PARU's all appreciated my not trying to give them away to the enemy. 

We watched all day long and saw some foot traffic down through the valley, but mostly villagers and locals.  We did see a few soldiers pass through but nothing alarming. I sent a coded message to Vientiane that we had  a "no joy" situation.  Simply meant we had not seen the enemy.  Now, we had to hope the caravan would not come through at night.  The ambush would have to take place in darkness without air cover.  I could not see a good outcome from fighting at night and not having the superior force, at least in numbers.

About an hour after daylight on day two, I saw the first signs of the caravan.  Three or four heavily armed personnel proceeded down the valley and then I saw the mules.  They were about three miles down the valley.  I immediately got on the radio and sent the message to Vientiane that "Snow White was hot."  I then got on the other radio and contacted the assault team and let them know the caravan had entered the valley.  They "rogered" the transmission.  Then I notified the TACAN team which was aware of what was going on because they had been monitoring the radio transmissions and told them to fire up the TACAN.  Now, it was time to wait again for the aircraft to call me when they got about 50 to 70 nautical miles from the TACAN.  The TACAN was hardly ever called that in the field.  It was known as the "beacon."  It was hoped that the timing would work out so that the entire caravan would be strung out in the valley when the B-26's's arrived out of Tahkli.  I assumed these aircraft were out of Tahkli because that is the only place I ever saw those aircraft types.
                                                                     

  EB6 Flight Computer

Above is a picture of an E-6B Flight Computer.  Mine was a Dalton, but they are mostly all alike. This is what I was trained to use in computing attack aircraft data.   Given the speed of the aircraft, the wind direction, altitude, and temperature, I could pretty well  put an aircraft on target.    In the case above, the aircraft were flying at about 200 knots on a heading of 350 degrees at 5000 feet.  Winds were at 230 degrees at 6 knots. Temperature at altitude was 50 to 60 degrees.  Given that information I was able to compute that the flight would need to make a turn to 290 degrees 90 seconds after passing the beacon to put them down the targeted valley for the attack.  They would need to be 1000 feet AGL when they crossed the peaks to the south.  Once I turned them down the valley, they would be on their own to carry out the attack.  

And so it began.  The folks on the trail heard the aircraft long before they saw them.  They tried to take cover by jumping over the side of the lower slope.  However, they were immediately met with gunfire from the assault team.  Then then they tried to get back up the slope, the aircraft started their run, one behind the other, with their machine guns chopping up people and mules.  The squeal and cries of the mules will stick with me always as they were shot down.  The aircraft made three passes and then the assault team called on the radio and said to call off the aircraft as it looked as if everyone was down.  I told Tango One to orbit to the south in case I needed them again.  I saw the assault team go up on the trail and shoot all the animals, wounded or not.  I wondered why they were doing that but was told later is was to deny their use again by the people supplying the guns....yeah, right on the weapons! Then they checked each downed individual to see if they were alive or not.   I knew the seriously injured would be capped.  I knew these guys were not going to leave witnesses in their business.  Those not wounded and those not seriously wounded would be taken somewhere in Thailand for detention and interrogation.  At least that is what was supposed to happen.

T-28 With Hard Points Under Wings

The assault team again radioed that it looked as if I could release the aircraft.   I told Tango One to  fly up the valley and make sure no one was coming down the trail which he did.  About that time I got the call from  Echo One that they were about 70 miles out from the "beacon."  I told him to maintain 5000 feet and orbit south of the beacon.   I then told Tango One and his wing man to turn to 220 degrees and climb to 7000 feet and report reaching that altitude.  That would take his flight away from the incoming aircraft.  When he called back that he was at 7000 feet, I told him to turn to 180 degrees, maintain 7000 and return to base.  He rogered that and then I told him to change to his base frequency which I did not know since I wasn't sure where they had come from.  That's the last I heard from him.  

Just as I released him and his flight, then I got a call from the inbound helicopters that they were about 30 minutes out ready for extraction.  But before I could say a thing three helicopters of unknown origin showed up and went down into the valley and began landing along the trail. The first thing I saw happen after they landed was that what looked to be two bodies were thrown out of the lead helicopter.  Then some assault team members drug the bodies up to where the ambush had taken place and laid them in the midst of some of the dead men killed during the raid.  I can on speculate as to what they were doing.  The assault team loaded the survivors onto one helicopter and it immediately left the site.  I could not tell if any of the people on the first helicopter were wounded assault team members or just captured prisoners.  The assault team then began throwing the sacks and boxes on the other two choppers.  From my location, it was hard to tell what was in the boxes, but through my binoculars I could see white powder coming out of some of the bags that had been shot up.  The bags that were too shot up to be moved were ripped open and they put as much of the white powder as they could in bags brought in by the choppers.  The rest they scattered on the road. Then the assault team climbed aboard the choppers and they took off.  They were loaded so heavily that I didn't think one of them was going to get off the ground.  They finally cleared the ridge about the time the two extraction helicopters showed up on site.   One picked up the TACAN team and the other picked us up.  I then released the other flight of T-28's and told them to return to base.

We were flown to LS-20A and I and the team parted company again.  I went to Vientiane to be debriefed and the PARU's went back to their base in Thailand.  That was my first exposure to the poppy wars in Laos, but it wouldn't be my last.

Notes:  After having thought about this for some time, I have always been puzzled as to where the three helicopters came from that picked up the drugs and assault team.  They were not in contact with me at any time.   I don't know where they came from or who they were.  I don't know where they went.  They must have knew where the site was and were standing by pretty close to it when the raid started.  My guess is that they were in contact with the assault team on some separate channel or radio.   There is no way of knowing or of finding out such information.

Another thing that puzzled me at the time was the dumping of the two bodies along the trail.  I guess I can speculate on this as well as anyone.  It may have been to give an identity to the attackers that would lead who ever found the bodies to believe they were someone besides who actually made the raid.  Just speculation, for sure.

Col. Bradley asked me, at the debriefing: "If asked, what would you say you saw today?"  I knew the answer before he asked it.  It was asked at every debriefing.  The standard answer was, "I didn't see a thing, sir, not a thing."  If things had gone badly, I would have been asked a lot of other questions, but not when an operation went well.   He probably had already heard from the assault team commander and knew all he needed to know.  He just wanted to make sure I knew what I was supposed to say if asked about this operation.

It's kind of like when I got my first briefing at Udorn in 1962.  I was told that once I left Incirlik, I ceased to exist until I got back to Incirlik.  I was told I had no name, no rank, so serial number, no parents, no home, no friends, no nothing.  I was told that if I was killed in Laos, I would be listed as missing in action until all hostilities ceased, then I would be listed as killed in an accidental aircraft accident or helicopter crash.   I was told I could never speak of what I did or saw in Laos, ever.  And until, I started this blog, I have not.   But, being that I am seeing all the names of people I knew there and many of the MACSOG ops are coming to light, I thought it was time to put this stuff on paper before I get to old to remember it.  So, I hope that what I put to paper will help enlighten those who want to know about such things and times.