Shot Down at Ban Hoeui San

Here is the story of the time we got shot down looking for an Air America C-46 that was shot down near the hamlet of Ban Hoeui San.  In the previous post I sent you to the Air America web page where you could read about this crash of this aircraft after receiving AAA fire while making a food drop to the Hmongs in the area.  There were at least two and maybe as many as four attempts to find the aircraft and recover the aircrew.  None were successful, but there had to be an effort because some of those in the aircrew were Americans. 

This event happened on September 5, 1963.  I, with my PARU team had just come back from an operation near the HCM Trail with an Army Special Forces team.  I was told that Col. Bradley wanted me to return to Vientiane with my team immediately.  When I arrived at Wattay Airport, Col. Bradley was waiting on me.  I old Akkrat to stand down and I went with Col Bradley to his office north of the airport.  He told me about the downed aircraft.  I was also told that one aircraft had tried to get to the site from Savannakhet, but encountered too much AAA fire to proceed.  Two T-28's had also tried to get near the site and were almost shot down themselves.  Col. Bradley asked if I wanted to make a run at it, but do it from the ground rather than try to fly to the site.  I was not ordered to do this, but volunteering would be a good course of action, whatever that meant.  The colonel said he would send in Peterson's Special Forces team and attach me to it if I was up to it.  Of all the SF teams I had worked with, Peterson's was the most experienced.  This was the legendary SF team, code named "Falcon" that ran as many missions in Laos in the early days of the war there as any other team in the history of the secret war in Laos.  Bradley said that there was a small landing site within ten miles of the crash site guarded by Hmong tribesmen and that it would be pretty safe to get to there.  I would have four T-28's out of Savannakhet for air support which meant they would be approximately an hour away from start up of engines to being overhead.  For us, the problem would be getting from the LS to the crash site. I could use my PARU team and we would be supplied some Hmong soldiers when I got to the landing site.  Up to this point he had not said who it was that had gotten shot down.  When he did, I was surprised at the names.  I knew both the pilot and the copilot. 

The pilot was Joe Cheney and the copilot was Charlie Herrick.  I knew of the loadmaster, but had never met him.  His name was Gene Debruin.  Col. Bradley said that there were others on board the aircraft serving as assistant loadmasters, but the number and nationality was unknown at the present time.  As far as he knew, it could be two, three, or four other persons involved.  What was needed to find is out what happened to the aircrew, how many there really were and were there any survivors.

C-46 at LS20A, Long Trieng

Because I knew these guys, my very first inclination was to say, "lets do it."  My second inclination, more thoughtful than my first said, "Why would I want to do this?"  This was a dangerous adventure at best.  We would be operating in Pathet Lao territory with only a few places held by the Hmongs.  He handed me a map and pointed to where the crash site was supposed to be.  He pointed out the presumed locations of Gen Van Pao's troops.   At least, that is where they were the last time they got information on them. He advised me that he had already briefed Peterson and that his team would meet my team back at Wattay. Then it was back to Wattay airport in Vientiane where my team was waiting for me.  My team was helping to refuel the chopper we had come in on and there were two Air America chopper crews standing around. I briefed Akkrat (my Thai sergeant and over the other team members) on what we were about to do.  I told him to prepare some Thai rations, more ammo, grenades, and be prepared to leave within a couple of hours. I told him to prepare for a two day mission close to the HCM trail.  He would brief his team later after the refueling was complete.    Because of his name, I usually called him "Rat Man."  One of the pilots came over and said they would be the main transport to the landing site within a few miles of the supposed crash site. I asked about the other AA crew and he said they were going to pick up some equipment to help us in our endeavor and they would be our backup in case of trouble.  While I was waiting for the SF team, I had one of my more lucid moments.  Here we are, soldiers who don't exist, going into a dangerous area looking for Americans who don't exist in a plane that doesn't exist in a country we weren't in.  How could we fail!  Nothing was real here!

Shortly, another vehicle pulled up and four heavily armed Americans got out wearing foreign uniforms.  I recognized Lt. Peterson as I had worked with him several times before.  He would be the 1-0 on the mission and we would be under his command on this mission.  He decided that we would wait until late evening and make a run at the Hmong village near the LS we were going to. The Enemy would think it was a food run and probably not pay much attention to us.  Extra cans of gas were loaded into the second chopper in case we needed it.  The second chopper  would to go to LS 383 and await our call.  LS 383 was just about 20 minutes flying time to where we were going.


The flight to our destination was uneventful.  No ground fire at all that we could tell.  We landed a few hundred yards from the Hmong village of Ban Wat and were met by a Hmong officer.  He said he could supply a few men to go with us who knew the area and would be of great help in reaching the crash site.  I radioed Vientiane and advised them that we were on the ground and proceeding with the operation. It was decided by the lieutenant  that we had better go now and get as close to the crash site as we could before daylight.  The Hmongs took the lead and we just followed them at intervals of about 5 yards.  We did the standard Special Forces combat march thing, ten minutes of movement and ten minutes of stop and listen.  I never worked with an experienced SF team that didn't do it this way.  Of course, it started raining but that was not a bad thing as the rain would muffle our steps and wash away our footprints.  After about a four hour hump, we were stopped by the Hmongs who told us, through Akkrat, that this was the line that divided what was controlled by General Van Pao's army and the Pathet Lao.  From now on we were in Pathet Lao territory.  We pressed on for another hour.  The SF guys decided this was far enough to go for the night.  We would stop and set up a RON (remain overnight) in which Lt. Peterson then set up a defensive perimeter and he sent some Hmongs on ahead as a sort of trail watch system. One of my Thais would watch the trail we had just come down.  Now I called a RON ( SF acronym) a "hide."  It means that you find a a place off the trail you are traveling that is well concealed and easily defensible.  Peterson had his team set up some claymore mines around the perimeter just in case trouble came our way.  Peterson actually taught me a lot during this mission in particular, especially about this RON thing. 

PARU Shoulder Tab

We began to talk to the Hmongs through one of the Thais and the told us that they had people who had seen the crash site but had not been able to get close enough to determine if there were survivors or not.  There were just too many Pathet Lao in the area.   Only two captives had been reported in the area and had been seen in the adjacent hamlet.  One was Caucasian  and one was either Thai or Laotian.  Besides that, they were being moved towards the east and the HCM trail.   The lieutenant nixed any idea of a rescue as we just did not have the personnel to be successful.  What he was really saying was that he didn't think his four man team and our five man team was enough to catch up with and overcome a force moving captives daily. Our job was to find out who was alive and who was dead and we couldn't be sure the two mentioned above were even part of the aircrew of the downed C-46.  After about 30 minutes of chatting with the Hmongs, some of us tried to get some sleep while we could.  The rain continued throughout the night.  We got in about two hours sleep each over the next four hours.

At dawn the lieutenant called me over and told me that he had given this project some serious thought.  He felt it was better to split up the force.  He wanted me and my team to follow some Hmong guides and go to a place that could support helicopter landings.  It would be in General Vang Pao's control area, but barely.  He would take his guys and a few Hmongs with him and try to get to the crash site.  In case of trouble, he would radio me and make a run for the site.  I was to call for extraction and air cover if needed immediately after he had contacted me.  Two Hmongs were pointed out by him and they then led us away from our location.  Peterson and his team disappeared into the jungle. 

It was a good half day hump to the proposed landing site (LS).  I looked at my map but could not find any indication that this was a known LS.  I later found out there were a lot of CIA landing sites not marked on any maps and known only to a few people.  This was one of those.    The landing site was about 1500 feet long and by the tracks in the mud, Helio Couriers and Porters had been coming in here on a regular basis.  It had about a 15 to 20 degree slope.  It was obvious that the fixed wings had been landing up hill and taking off downhill.  It was certainly adequate for H-34 and Bell 204 helicopters.   By this time the rain had stopped and the skies has cleared to some extent.  All that was left to do was wait.

I contacted Vientiane and let them know the situation and what the lieutenant had told me to do.  This was now September 6, a full day after the aircraft was shot down. It was just after dark when the radio came to life and the SF radioman shouted out my call sign over the air.  "Navigator, we've gone hot.  Could not get to crash site.  Made contact with enemy force of unknown size.  Two Hmongs are dead and one wounded.  On our way to you.  Eight hours out.  Over."   I rogered his transmission and asked what they needed me to do, but there was no response.  I then contacted Vientiane and advised them of the situation by coded CW message.  I advised them that they needed to have the extraction helicopters and aircraft in the air in 7 hours.  They came back about 30 minutes later and asked me where I was.  My exact words were, "I have no idea. I am at a LS not marked on my map but approximately 25 kilometers west of  LS363.  On the map I am approximately 18 degrees 35 minutes north by 104 degrees 18 minutes east.  Over."   They came back a little later and said they knew where I was and would launch the extraction aircraft at 0600.  Again, now it was time to wait for the SF team to get back in touch with me.  And the wait was not long.

The radio once again came to life and the radioman said that they were in contact with a sizable enemy force but it wasn't as sizable as it had be an hour ago.  I think you can get his meaning.  He asked if I was in a position to see the valley below and I rogered that I was.  He said they would fire a pen flare and I was to let them know which direction they needed to go to get to our location.  I again rogered the transmission.  A few seconds later I saw the flare and looked at my compass and gave them a heading to our location.  The radioman rogered the transmission and again the radio went silent.  From where I saw the flare, they were a good six kilometers from my location and in heavy jungle.

I need to make a note here that I should have made earlier.  During this time in Laos (and as far as I know the way it was even later) three types of distance measurements were used in Laos.  The standard measure was kilometers and that is what the military on the ground used.  And the indigenous people used kilometers.  However, there were civilian contractors and operatives (CIA, USAID) who tended to still use regular miles for measurement purposes.   The USAF and Navy used nautical miles with a nautical mile slightly longer than a mile, with a mile longer than a kilometer.  Some of the maps I carried were in miles, some in kilometers, none in nautical miles.  One NM equals 1.85200 km or 1.15 miles.  When making computations, I had to convert one to the other.   An easy task with the EB-6 flight computer but a little more time consuming with a pencil and paper.  So, in this case I had a CIA  map in in statute miles and I had my EB-6.  I made mental notes and then converted all the numbers into kilometers for the SF team and then back to nautical miles for the aircrews.

About an hour later we could hear weapons going off, both 9MM sub-machine gun fire, BAR  and AK-47. There was a lot of gunfire in valley.  It was distant, but very distinctive coming out of the valley below.  I had to assume that the SOG team would come up the same trail we used so the Paru's put themselves in position to have some clear firing zones down the trail if needed.   My guys were armed with AK-47's and I was carrying my Swedish K sub-machine gun. The gunfire was intermittent and seemed to lessen as time went on.  I again radioed Vientiane and advised them of the situation.  I asked if they could have the choppers overhead  by daylight.   The rogered that they could.

A little later the 1-1 radioman called again and said that they were still in contact with a sizable force.  Also, he advised me that some had gone around them....maybe three or four, he wasn't sure, but thought that was how many there were and they would probably try to cut the SOG team off before they could get to the LS.  He told me that the 1-0 had said to tell me to be on the lookout and do what we could.  I rogered the transmission and called my Thais over to talk to them.  I briefed them on what I had just been told.  I told them that I had seen a trail somewhat parallel to ours that met this trail in a clearing about 1000 yards below.  I said we need to go to that site and hold it if we could.  We made a mad dash down the mountain and arrived at the clearing about 20 to 30 minutes later.  I hoped that I had made the correct calculations on what I thought was going to happen.

About 45 minutes later I heard noises on the parallel trail.  I radioed Falcon and asked if they were on the mountain yet.  The radioman said they had just got to the base of the mountain.  I told him I thought we were going to have company.  About then, one after another, what I thought to be Pathet Lao troops walked into the clearing.  First one, then two, then a total of six in all.   Per earlier instructions, my Thais waited until we were pretty sure this was all of them and then Akkrat and his men opened fire.  That is when all hell broke lose.

I figure that every one of the Thais fired at least ten rounds and maybe twenty in one case.  It lasted all of about 15 seconds and all six enemy soldiers went down. However, they did get off some rounds and narrowly missed hitting Akkrat.  Just about the time the firing subsided in the clearing,  I caught some movement to my right and when I was able to focus on them in the dark, it was another two enemy soldiers about fire on Akkrat.  I swung and around fired about ten or so rounds from my Swedish K in their direction.    Akkrat saw them about the same time I did and he turned and fired on them as well.  It must have caught them by surprise as they probably thought that Akkrat and his men were all of there was.   They all went down in a hail of bullets.  But that wasn't the end of it.  Another PL burst into the clearing and was almost on top of Akkrat when I dropped him in his tracks.  All three were able to get off a few rounds but they hit nothing but the jungle.  We waited to see if there were any more, but it didn't appear there were.  Akkrat sent one of his men down to finish off all the wounded which he did.  Remember, this is war and a war that wasn't.  There could be no witnesses.  It was just the way it was.  There could be no one left to tell how many of us there were or our unit makeup.  Akkrat signaled me to come down and look at the carnage.  He rolled one of the soldiers over and was I surprised.  These were not Pathet Lao soldiers.  They were NVA regulars.  I was surprised because I had no idea they were this far west or south.  I told Akkrat to reset his men and we would wait to see what happened next.

I then sent another coded message to Vientiane and told them that our force had run into regular NVA troops, not PL troops. They radioed back that they would get back with me.  About that time we saw someone coming up the main trail.  It was Team Falcon and a few Hmongs.  When Peterson stepped into the clearing and saw the dead NVA laying there, he too was surprised.  He said, "No wonder they kept coming at us earlier this morning.  These guys are "hard core NVA regulars."  Peterson acted like he was surprised that they were regular NVA, but I don't think he really was.

We made it back up to the LS and waited for daybreak.  Peterson sent a couple of Hmongs down the trail to watch for enemy troops headed our way, but none ever showed up.  Eventually, the Hmongs came back up the trail and said it didn't appear that any other NVA were on the mountain.  It was now just getting to be daybreak and about 20 minutes later we heard the first chopper as it approached the LS.  As the helicopters began to make their approach, Peterson sent the Hmongs back where they came from.   The first chopper  landed and the SOG team boarded it and took off.  The second chopper landed and the pilot said I needed to talk to Vientiane.  The pilot handed me his headset and I heard Bradley's voice on the other end.  He asked me if I was sure those were NVA.  I said yes I was.  He then asked me if I still had some smoke with me.  I looked at my PARUS and they had one canister each plus the one I had.  That made four.  I told Bradley that is what I had available.  He then said that we needed to make a pass down through the valley and drop smoke where we thought the NVA were.  He would provide some close air support to drop ordinance on the sites I marked.

I asked Bradley how I was going to know exactly where these folks were.  He said and I quote: "Fly down the damn valley and when the shoot at your chopper drop smoke on them."  Well, hell, why didn't I think of that!  Just get shot at so we would know where they were.  He told me that he would have air assets overhead in 30 minutes.  When they contacted me, we were to take off and fly down the valley and draw fire.  I rogered the transmission and signed off.  I asked the pilots if they were aware of what we were about to do.  They said they had a feeling this was the plan.  The pilot told me that we would fly low and fast and when we encountered fire, we would drop the smoke and get the hell out of the valley.....if we were still in one piece that is.

The next voice I heard over the UHF set was a Laotian I knew very well.  He was a major (I think) at this time and he was an excellent pilot and leader.  His name was Thau Ma. He eventually became a general of the Laotian Air Force and attempted a least two coups against the Laotian government before he was finally killed in 1973.  His first words to me were, "Navigator, this is Blue Leader with three friends.  Waiting for your run.  Over."  I rogered his transmission and told him we were starting up and would be airborne shortly.  I asked him his location and he told me he was at my 8 o'clock position at 5000 feet.  I finally saw his flight as we were getting airborne.  The pilot said he would go around the mountain and come in from the north and make the run south.  He told me make as small a target as we could.  I collected the four other smoke canisters and got ready.  I decided not to sit in the door but behind it as that would make at least some protection against ground fire.  We made it around the mountain and then took off down the valley.  About a mile into the run we began to see tracers from the east side of the valley.  The pilot make a turn slightly to the east and  then banked back to the west and said, "Drop them now, this is a close as we are going to get."  I pulled the pins and  threw all four out the door, one right after another.  I then got on the radio and told Thau Ma that the enemy was firing at us from about 800 meters east of the smoke.  The helicopter pilot then made a sharp turn to the west and began to climb for altitude.  Just as we cleared the mountain I saw the first T-28 make a run down the valley.  A lot of fire was coming up at him and it wasn't all small arms.  I saw the explosions from his bomb drop and then he went out of view as we went beyond the mountain.

Well, we had gotten away with that somehow.  There were a few holes in the chopper but I thought we must have been high enough that small arms didn't do too much damage.  Wrong!  Just as I had that thought, I heard a loud squeal and smoke started filling the chopper's cabin.  I heard the pilot say some curse words and then he yelled back to get ready for a hard landing.  We flew for about another three or four kilometers as we lost altitude.  The pilot tried to find a clearing and settled on one that wasn't quite big enough for the chopper.  He pulled the chopper up at a steep angle just above the trees and we went straight down and hit the ground.  The blades hit the trees on either side of the chopper and flew into small pieces of shrapnel flying off into the trees. Just as we all got out of the chopper it caught fire.  My experience here is that where there is fire and smoke, soon there will be enemy soldiers if we happen to be in their territory.  I told the pilots to head down the mountain led by one my team members.  Akkrat, the two other PARU and myself, would follow them at a distance to make sure no one caught up to them.  The pilot had said that he had issued a "Mayday" call and gave Vientiane our approximate position.  I had salvaged our radios so we would at least be able to talk to any aircraft in the area. 

As it turned out, and, as fortune smiled on us, we had crashed in an area held by the Hmongs of General Vang Pao.  It wasn't long until they made contact with us and told us they would meet us at the base of the mountain.  After we met with them, they led us to an LS.  A couple of hours later we were on our way back to Vientiane.  I had nothing but praise for the Air America crew.  How we managed to get back in one piece although our transport was trashed was a miracle and a great feat of flying.  I also have nothing but praise for Team Falcon.  They were truly professional soldiers and never showed fear in the face of extreme danger.  I will always remember those guys. and finally, my PARU's.  These guys were outstanding and absolutely fearless.  The all assumed they were going to die in this war, so why fear death.  It was coming to them anyway.  We did lose some of them later, but for now, we were all okay and heading back to our respective bases.